The Social Scientist’s Responsibility for Values in a Democratic Society by Troyer Maurice E.
The Sada! Scientist’s Respons,bility for Values 1 
!he Social Scientist’s Responsibility for Values 
in a 
Democratic Society 
By Maurice E. Troyer 
Vice President for Education 
Internahonal Chnshan Univemty 
Responsibility for values in our mid 20th 目前田ydilemmas 
needs far more attention than scholars m democratic societies are 
prone to give. This is especially and crucially the case m the 
・sc cial sciences. Two major factors motiva也 professorsto“lean 
over backwards" or away from the values problem. First, academic 
freedom which accords to each the nght to thmk, believe and speak 
according to his own hghts makes scholars overly cautious in 
presentmg their own ideas with convictz・onm the classroom lest 
they seem to be imposing their ideas on others. Second, the 
struggle of scholars m the social studies to become recognized 
・scientists m the traditional sense encourages p日occupat10nwith 
scientific method in the discovery of truth, but,demal of responsibility 
for values. This is true of scholars m many other disciplmes. 
But our concern m this paper is、.vith the social scientist's 
responsibility for values. 
Almost invariably, pundits writing about the potentially 
.cataclysmic current world confhct characterize it as a struggle for 
・the minds of men: a struggle over what men are、villmgto work 
for, sacrifi田 for,live for, die for; a struggle to influence values 
that田rveas ends and shape means. 
The crucial question in democratic society is whether or not 
・scholars can afford the luxury of academic freedom without ac目pting
responsibihty for values basic to that freedom and whether or not 
they can accept the role of scientist and abdicate respJnsibihty for 
・the value con目quencesof their discoveries. 
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Are the dangers of indoctrination so mherent and pervasive as; 
to preclude takmg a strong position worth defendmg and promotmg? 
Free scholars I田ttheir freedom by default m Germany and other・ 
countries durmg the thirties. Othersτose up to defend their 
freedoms in time of crises. Is it permissible to mdoctrinate values-
basic to freedom only m times of cnsis? 
If the pundits are correct a cnsis now exists One camp in the・ 
present world conflict holds that a self・estabhshed and se!f-perpetuat-
ing elite of the proletanate shall determine the goals and shape the 
ends which al must accept and that those who do not submit may 
be tendered impotent or liqmdated. Their indoctrination is-
deliberate, calculated, systematic, comprehensive and severely 
disciplined. In essence the state under the domination of the ehte• 
becomes the end, the individual the means. When the mdividual 
becomes the means the governing become the masters. And the・ 
masters become a class, albeit, undeで theguise of developing a. 
classless society. 
To state the basic question again: Can democracy that em-・ 
phas1zes the worth and freedoms of the mdiv1dual survive• 
without persistent, contmuous and systematic indoctrination on some 
fundamental values ? For example, does academic freedom permit 
freedom to destroy that freedom? The answers to either the・ 
general or the more specific quest10n are not easy. Mieklejohn in守
his recent book, Political Freedom＂＇，恒y•yes to the latter quest10n. 
However, the Umversity of Washmgton some twelve years ago,. 
in considering the status of three professors, established first the・ 
prmciple that the nght to teach 1s something more than the right 
to citizenship. The teaching profess10n in a democracy rests squarely-
on academic freedom. Hence any professor who ]Oms an organiz-
ation m which those in authority prescribe the boundaries withm 
which he must mterpret truth has broken faith with the profession・ 
( 1) Mieklejohn, Alexander, Political Freed，脚（NewYork: Harper & 
Br田，〕 1960.
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and has thus jeopardized his status in the profession. This premise 
would imply that academic freedom does not accord freedom to 
destroy that freedom. 
Dr. M1ekeljohn ts entitled to his position on non・mdoctrination. 
A democratic society should accord him the freedom to“mdoctn・ 
nate”m the doctrme of non-indoctrination. He ts dynamic and 
pos1t1ve m his defense of the fundamental values of freedom. 
Furthermore his po,1tton may have a large degree of validity in a 
society established by those seeking freedom of behef and expression 
and somewhat matured by successive generations seeking to 
mamtain and extend those freedoms. On the other hand sensitivity 
to the dangers of freedom to destroy freedom may not be sufficient 
m a society relatively immature m the values and processes of 
democracy. Democratic convictions in Germany under the Weimar 
Republic were adolescent m the face of long-standing Teutomc 
traditions of authoritarianism. Thus Nazism, with relative ease, 
replaced freedom, including a long-standing tradition of academic 
freedom with authority. 
Values of democracy are broader than academic freedom. 
Admittedly it is di伍cultand it may be impossible to derive a 
basic common denommator of values acceptョbleto al who claim an 
a伍nityfor democracy. Those who readily compromise freedom 
with authority will take a relative view of indoctrination ; those 
who attempt an absolutist view of freedom will resist indoctrination 
of every kind. 
It 1s significant however that the relativist and the absolutist 
in countries with long established comprehensive democratic traditions 
al joined forces in the common回 useof defending the common 
values of democracy when threatened by 、1ar. It was equally 
significant that war itself imposed a high degree of authoritarianism 
withm the relatively democratic society. And it 1s even more 
significant that the absolutist ioined the relativist in indoctrination 
to the回 useof defendmg basic democratic values in the crises of 
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In the U. Sム， duringWorld War I, a spontaneous group of 
the nation’s leaders in busmess, public a百airs,and the professions 
fearful that basic democratic values might be lost sight of m 
trme of war and that return to them after the war mrght be 
di伍cult，皿etregularly to think seriously about the basic values 
of democracy. The result of their deliberations was publrshed 
under the aegis of Common Cause, Inc. The following par-
agraphs are quoted from their statement，“Thrs is Democracy.” 
Democracy means personal worth : Every human bemg is 
precrous m his own nght and is always to be regarded as an 
end, never as a means merely .. The state is made for man, 
not man for the State. Here is the foundation of al humane 
conceptions of hfe and the ultimate source of the other articles 
of our faith. 
Democracy means freedom ; .. Every man should be free to thmk 
and speak, to write and create . . . to improve his condition 
to follow the dictates of his conscience, to pursue in his own 
way truth and happiness .. 
Democracy means equalrty ; . . . recognizes no orders commis 
sioned by God or quahfied by their own attributes to exploit, 
govern or enslave their fellow human bemgs. 
Democracy means md1vidual opportunity : It means a ..田口ety
m which any man can make his way according to his own 
talents, inclinations and beliefs a society which makes 
available to al an abundance of opportunity m work, in health, 
in education, in soロalrelationships, in human enlightenment, 
in al the arts and sciences of lrfe. 
Democracy means md1v1dual responsibility ・ All men should be 
disciplined by a sense of common brotherhood, a devotion to 
the general welfare and a love of truth and justice. If (men〕．．
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are callous to wrongs and inequalities, 1f they are indifferent to 
the public good, they will surely sink back into bondage .. 
To these concepts of democracy Abraham Lincoln’s earlier 
definition gives inescapable meanmg：“As I would not be a slave, 
so I would not be .a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. 
Whatever differs from it to the extent of the d市町田ceis no 
.democracy.”Thus Lincoln casts leadership in the role of servant 
rather {than master, service rather than power. Perhaps this 
concept could be added to the list. 
Roles of the maiority and minority have not been mentioned. 
Perhaps they have a place here, recogmzing that the majonty vote 
1s a tool rather than a basic value. And it is the only effective 
tool, discovered thus far, for implementmg the basic values and at 
the same time protecting them for the greatest number m society. 
Tyranny of the majonty is avoided by assuring the mmonty freedom 
to continue the educat10nal process toward their point of view so 
1ong as the will of the maiority is not blocked or destroyed. If the 
minority succeeds m blocking the will of the majority, then 
government is by tyranny of the mmonty and the freedom of 
the maiority 1s m jeopardy. So is democracy. 
It日 lhzth田isof this pap2r that one of the向S戸onsibilities
.of education, of teachers, and es虫g口allyof social scientisおか a
democracy is to seek continuously to cla円か basic叩 luesof 
democracy and to extend and声rotectthem in al units of society : 
the ho附e,school, church, local community, the state and the 
nation. 
This does not mean that a tribunal prescribes a definition of 
the basic values of democracy or that a defimtion of wide acceptance 
has the same meanmg for each c1t1zen. But it does mean that 
each professor in the social scences、1'ouldbe persistent m hi' 
<:oncern for the question ，“Knowledge and skil for what '" He 
would be diligent m his e百ortsto clarify ends and means And he 
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would help students to try to draw from his courses-his lectures 
and the wider readings-that which would help them develop 
concepts of reahty in which they have confidence and value 
orientations that would have clear meaning and influence as they 
take positions on issues and make crucial decis10ns m the interest 
of individual and group welfare. 
At thIS point it is appropriate to make some observations on 
some evident conditions in education relevant to the role of values 
Throughout the world, unzversitities are growing by leaps and 
bounds in number and in size, in faculty and students. Research 
and researchers are increasingly abundant. There are more countries 
with extended compulsory school attendance requirements and 
opportunities in public education More books are published and 
read. Libraries are growing. Magazines and nz回S骨apershave 
greater circulation Radio and television provide new mass-media 
for learnmg. 
Paralleling this previously mcomparable growth is mcreasing 
conf田町民 confl!ct,frustration, and fear throughout the world.It 
is the countries with the greatest breadth of educat10n and depth 
research that threaten the destruction of “civilization”Why? 
Perhaps it is because, to a considerable and dangerous extent, 
professors have assumed that knowledge and skill are the ultimate 
goals of education and have abdicated responsibility for that aspect 
of educational development that determines whether knowledge and 
skil Wiii be used for the benefit or destruction of mankind. 
Knowledge is power to create or to destroy. Whether it 
creates or destroys depends on the values that serve as ends and 
shape the means. 
Many in the academic profess10n stand forthrightly on the 
traditional or proverbial statement that truth makes f叩 e.
Thinking under this umbrella runs somethmg hke this.“As a 
scholar, my tool is res each-my goal the discovery of truth.”“As 
a teacher, my responsility is to commumcate truth to students.” 
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“Truth is not moral.”“It is truth regardless of rehgion or secular 
ideology.”“Truth is universal.，“The funct10n of the university 
is the discovery and dissemination of universal truth." This then 
tends to be the sum and substance of the umversity professor’s 
responslibility. 
But is truth synonymous with wisdom? Wisdom involves 
the selection of those truths useful m solvmg problems. Solutions 
of problems usually involve a choice of directions. Directions 
imply goals. And the di旺erencebetween goals is a difference 
m values. If a professor mcludes m his defimt10n of truth, 
understanding to the end of creating wisdom, he assumes. 
responsibility for values If he excludes understandmg and wisdom 
from his defimt10n of truth, he abdicates responsibihty for values. 
The facts of our mid-20th century dilemma as stated above would' 
indicate inadequate concern or responsibility for values. Let us. 
therefore analyze this problem in some detail. 
Many history professors; anthporologists, pohtical scientists,. 
economists, sociolog1sts and psychologists are satisfied with being 
historians of their dsciplines, backing into the future. This is-
1ot to quarrel with history. Cicero was right，“To be ignorant of 
the past is to remam a child” But it might be equally pertinent to・ 
add ；“To forget to turn and face the future is to remain an 
adolescent." 
For six decades, physical scientists, conscientiously attempting: 
to achieve and maintam their emancipation from philosophy, demed, 
responsibility for values 
This leaves responsibility for values in our universities to th<> 
philosophers. But scholars m the宣eldsof philosophy (mcludmg 
political and economic and social philosophy〕 cannotcontmue to 
escape their responsibihty as they have been doing for the past 
half century. 
The charges against philosophers in the several disciplines are・ 
mainly three First, they (except for the more creative ones〕五nch
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ヨtmore comfortable to be historians of their discipline than to help 
・students to develop, for themselves, concepts of reahty and values 
-that will serve as goals to reach for criteria to live by. 
Secondly, they are becoming a cult of logical analys1sts. Like 
τnany scientists they raise their eyebrows at what they consider 
-the superfic1ahty or“do-goodism”of a colleague whose sense 
of responsibility reaches mto the realm of prophesy or beyond what 
is approved by the cult. 
Third, many philosophers unwittingly have placed a purely 
intellectual emphasis on their value constructs. Behavior controlled 
by the viscera (below the ears) tends to be vegetative, re自exive,
.accordmg to habit pattern without conscious value. Behavior 
controlled by the intellect is cognitive, rational, selertive withm 
・the rationale. 
It is with the latter that most philosophers have been 
preoccupied. As, with the scientists m search of true obiectivity, 
-emotions must be completely subordmated. 
This was true of John Dewey. Needless to say his knowledge 
-of psychology was extraordinary, and he penetrated the depths 
-of democratic values and processes But his insistence on 
non mdoctrmahon fel short of the reinforcement of intellectually 
derived values with conviction. This perhaps apphes with much 
greater vahd1ty to his d1sc1ples than to Dewey himself. 
Behavior nurtured and controlled below the ears is powerful 
but dangerous, for example, the Nazi's annihilation of the Jews 
Behavior controlled from the ears up may be rat10nal but without 
・force. Episodes marking great strides in the evolut10n of social 
behavior in the solution of maior conflicts have at their base 
-creative intellectual direction and control, dnven by the power of 
-emot10ns, sustained by strong conviction. 
Leaders of church and state m the U.S.A , in a misguided 
-concept of separation of church and state. have been greatly 
influenced by Dewey’S conv1ctionless doctrines of non-mdoctrmation. 
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Consequently every teacher in the public schools (and many i1t. 
private, even church related schools) is employed with either a 
“legal ”restnct1on or tacit understanding that he must leave a 
major田町田 ofhis values and indeed al religious values on the 
outside of the door as he enters the classroom. Those whか
seek to implement Japan’s post-war regulations on separation of 
rehgion and government are prone to the same error. 
What is the errorフ Itderives from confusmg the separation 
of church and state as orgamzations, which is possible without 
destroying either, with the separat10n of religion and government as. 
systems of values which 1s impossible without weakening either. 
A man’s value system is not divisible into discrete parts without: 
creatmg a multiple or schizoid personality or the submergen白
and eventual atrophy of some of the parts. 
The integrated, whole, effective, creative personality is one that 
tends strongly toward the acquisition of knowledge, ordered in 
relat10n to clearly conceived values that serve as goals and shape 
proces出品 resultmgin behavior sustained by for出 ofconvict10n. 
supported with the energy of well organized or controlled emotions. 
Goldsen'" closes the Cornell study of values of students m. 
eleven universities with the following paragraphs. 
“Man today has conquered the atom and invaded space Yet 
the basic problem of the human condition remams unchanged . 
how to live with uncertamty and make one's peace with it ; 
how to mvest the days of one's life with meaning. Perhaps. 
these quest10ns encompass the basic criteria for measurmg thee 
SU町田sof edu回 tion.”
But on the precedmg page they re凹，rted:
“The religious values the students prefer seem to be broadly 
( 1) Goldsen, Rose K., et al., What College Students Think (Princeton,. 
New Jwey: D. Van Nostrand Company)1960, pp 202-3. 
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dispersed, highly personal, relative and vague. These beliefs and 
values seem to be only weakly engaged in the opmions, 
attitudes and behav10r they re凹，rtin other spheres of -life. 
At the same time, we have reported certam mdi田tionsthat 
the young people on these campuses are dissatisfied with this 
sort of philosophical climate. Almost al the students fel, they 
say, a need for relig10us or philosophical guides to provide 
<irientation and meaning to their lives. It is as if they were 
aware that empiricism, rationalism and relativism do not provide 
this sense of meaning, that it must be sought m a behef 
system that speci自esirreducible standards of value, not relative 
ones. One senses a certam nostalgia for such absolute gmdes 
for the guarantees of certamty that only faith田nprovide.” 
Jacob "' after studying research on the value consequences of 
nigher educat10n in numerous colleges and universities concludes 
that courses and professors make litle impact on the values of 
・College students. Incidental (or accidental) social and extra-curncla 
college life does influence their values. They tend to be emancipated 
from the restrictive traditions of the mores without studied analyses 
・of the values toward which they may be emancipated 
Jacob ’S review and the Cornell studies reinforce the validity of 
the observation and analysis of the posture of the social scientist 
・toward respnsibilty for values as presented above. 
In conclusion it may be appropriate to add another challenge 
The responsibility of the social scientist for values applies to 
・research as well as teaching. The quest10n“Know ledge and skill 
ior what？” is as pertment m the discovery as in the dissemination 
of truth. For example, econometrics may i;irove just as useful 
to power centered leaders as to the service oriented leader, to big 
busmess as to litle business, to big government as to litle govern-
(2〕Jacob,Philip E , Changing Values in College (New York: Harρer & 
Bros.) 1957. 
The Socrnl Scientist’s Respon,insibility for Values 1 
ment, to totalitarian as to representative govenment, to sub1ugatlon 
as to freedom, to war as to peace, to revolution as to evolution 
What democracy needs m today’s crises is a social science staffed 
with scholars who are students of democratic values to the pomt of 
conviction that they are worth defendmg and promotmg through 
research and instruction. If the freedoms of men are fundamental, 
the social researcher needs to be enough of a philosopher to be 
sensitive to the significance of his study for those freedoms. The 
same is true of human welfare. Much rese日archon administrative 
structure and theory in the interests of e伍c1encyhas ignored 
consequenences in relation to freedoms and welfare. Philosophers 
alone cannot be blamed for our present predicament. They are tno 
few to be made the scapegoat. A free society is not long free 
unless al are philosophers. 
Limitation of freedom has dangers-even the least limitation 
such as limitmg freedom to destroy freedom. Who is to de口de
what is destructive> And once limitations start where do they stop? 
These are difficult question. But they are crucial They may 
indeed be the most vital questions in democracy today. This means 
simply that they must be seriously studied. 
But the seriousness of these quest10ns will be greatly diminished 
if scholars become more seriously conscious of the responsibilities 
that are the concomitants of the freedoms they demand and exercise. 
There is significant research to show that there is widespread 
understanding and acceptance of the freedoms of democracy but 
relatively litle understanding and acceptance of the responsib1ht1es 
attendant on those freedoms. These reponsibilities are as much a 
matter of values as. the freedoms themselves. And they should be 
:egarded as responsibilities that are mescapable if democracy is to 
be dynamic and strong m the face of challenges from other ideologies 
that depend on strong programs of mdoctrmat10n. 
